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ABSTRACT
Recent American patent scholarship has begun to explore the 
intersection of the patent system and guarantees of expressive freedom,
noting that patents may impinge on the First Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution and chill or prohibit protected speech. But guarantees of 
expressive freedom are not limited to the Federal Constitution; they are 
also found in state constitutional provisions, some of which offer broader 
protection than that guaranteed in the First Amendment. In this essay I 
examine the relationship between federally issued patents and the 
guarantees of expressive freedom found in state constitutions. State 
constitutions vary in their wording and interpretation, so my primary
focus will be on those states that have viewed their state constitutional 
provisions as extending beyond the protections offered by the federal 
First Amendment. While the Supremacy Clause prevents states from
overriding federal patent law, I argue here that state constitutional 
provisions can alter, shape, or even prohibit certain types of patent
assertions, just as state law may moderate other uses of personal property.
The discussion of this interaction highlights several previously 
unexplored aspects of the vertical relationship between federal patent 
policy and state law, and offers an alternative route to vindicating 
expressive rights encumbered by patents.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent scholarship has begun to probe the relationship between
utility patents and constitutional guarantees that protect free 
expression.1 Intellectual property commentators have pointed out that
when patents cover expressive subject matter, they may suppress or 
retard protected speech. Such scholarly investigation has gone on for 
decades in the related area of copyright, as well as in other areas where
intellectual property is involved, such as trademark or right of publicity
law.2 But this inquiry is still nascent where patents are concerned. 
The paucity of commentary regarding patents and freedom of 
speech likely stems in part from the sense that utility patents—unlike
intellectual property such as copyright or trademarks—regulate
technological rather than expressive activity. If patents have little
purchase on expressive activity, it seems to follow that patent law will 
have little intersection with the law guaranteeing freedom of 
1. See Dan L. Burk, Content Discriminatory Patents: A Response to Professor Chiang, 108 
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 37 (2019); Tun-Jen Chiang, Patents and Free Speech, 107 GEO. L.J. 309 (2019);
Dan L. Burk, Patents and the First Amendment, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 197 (2018); Dan L. Burk,
Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000).
 2. See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L.
REV. 1095 (2003); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A
Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the
First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970). 














     
    
    
 
   
 
   
 
    
  
 32020] PATENTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH 
expression. But technology is integral to expression and
communication, and this relationship is increasingly pronounced with 
the development and proliferation of informational processing
technologies.3 Legal restrictions such as patent exclusivity on the use of 
communications devices, methods of advertising, or computer code 
inevitably restrict speech.4 A developing understanding of the 
expressive restrictions posed by patents suggests that their technical 
orientation still entails restrictions on freedom of speech. 
A related reason for failing to examine the intersection of patent 
law and freedom of speech may be the various doctrinal objections to
the possibility of such an intersection. Among the most pertinent 
objections to considering the intersection of the two is the argument 
that patents are a form of private property right and are enforced by
private owners rather than by the state.5 Federal constitutional
guarantees covering freedom of expression guard against 
governmental rather than private interference with speech.6 Patents are 
typically understood to be privately held property rights.7 Thus, the 
argument goes, because constitutional rights protect against actions by 
the state, they would never intersect with patent law, because patent 
enforcement constitutes private rather than state action. 
I have detailed elsewhere a number of reasons as to why this 
particular argument should have little traction in the context of federal 
First Amendment jurisprudence.8 But in this article, I take up an 
alternative or additional response to such objections: even if considered 
private property, patents may violate constitutional rights to free 
speech because not all free speech provisions require state action.
Certainly, state action is the general rule with regard to the Federal
3. See Jedidiah Purdy, Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 202 (2014) (noting the shift in First Amendment jurisprudence for
the “information age”). 
4. See Burk, Patents and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 213; Chiang, supra note 1 at 
327–28. 
5. See Burk, Patents and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 235; Chiang, supra note 1 at 
331–32. 
6. See Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional
Protection Against Private Abridgement, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157, 159–62 (1985)
(summarizing federal constitutional state action doctrine). 
7. But see Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 584 U.S. ___, 138 
S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (characterizing patents as a type of “public franchise” for purposes of
judicial review).
 8. See Burk, Patents and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 235; see also Chiang, supra
note 1, at 334–35 (arguing that the action of the United States Patent Office provides state action
to patent issuance). 
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4 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
Constitution’s First Amendment provision for freedom of speech.9 
However, most state constitutions also contain provisions guaranteeing 
freedom of speech, and a number of these have been interpreted to 
extend to private action involving private property.10 It is conceivable 
that these interpretations could, under defined circumstances, be 
extended to an intellectual property right such as a patent when that 
right suppresses expression guaranteed by that state.
Consequently, in this article I examine the relationship between
federally issued patents and the guarantees of expressive freedom
found in state constitutions. State constitutions vary in their wording
and interpretation, so my primary focus will be on those states that 
have viewed their state constitutional provisions as extending beyond
the protections offered by the federal First Amendment. While the 
Supremacy Clause prevents states from overriding federal patent law, I 
argue here that state constitutional provisions can alter, shape, or even 
prohibit certain types of patent assertions, just as state law may 
moderate other uses of personal property. The discussion of this
interaction highlights several previously unexplored aspects of the
vertical relationship between federal patent policy and state law, and 
may offer an alternative route to vindicating expressive rights 
encumbered by patents, including a surprising new approach to
ongoing problems regarding standard-essential patents.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
Although the federal constitutional guarantees of the First 
Amendment have been the primary source of expressive rights in the 
United States, they are not the only guarantee of such rights. Most state
constitutions also entail provisions guaranteeing freedom of 
expression.11 Some of these provisions merely parallel the language and
protections found in the Federal Constitution, but in other cases state 
constitutional guarantees may offer somewhat broader protections.12 
9. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); see also Kevin Cole, Federal and State “State
Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 329–32 
(1990) (tracing the history of the federal state action doctrine). 
10. See  TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC SPACES 172–75 (2009); Jennifer Friesen, Should California’s Constitutional
Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Actors?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111,
114 (1989).
 11. Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 
VAND. L. REV. 620, 622–23 (1951).
12. Sue Davis & Taunya Lovell Banks, State Constitutions, Freedom of Expression, and
Search and Seizure: Prospects for State Court Reincarnation, 17 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 13 













   
 
    
 
  
    
 
   
   
     
    
  
    
   
    
   
    
       
 
   
   
 
 
    
  
      
   
 52020] PATENTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH 
Significantly for this discussion, these broader state rights have 
sometimes been held to extend to speech expressed on private tangible
property.13 Under the federal First Amendment, restrictions on speech
exercised by private property owners on their own land have been held
to lie outside the constitutional purview. But this is not necessarily the 
case for state constitutional provisions.14 
Instead, some states have interpreted their constitutional 
provisions as either not requiring a state action element or in some
other fashion extending guarantees for freedom of expression to 
private property.15 The broader rights associated with some state 
constitutional speech provisions logically follow from their broader 
language.16 Unlike the free speech provision of the Federal 
Constitution, which is phrased in the negative, the free speech
provisions of many states are couched in the affirmative.17 Rather than
declaring that “Congress shall make no law,” many states provide some
variation of the language that “[e]very citizen shall have the right to 
freely speak, write, and publish.”18 Rather than mandating a constraint 
(1987); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379, 384–86 (1980). 
13. See, e.g., Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 103 A.3d 249, 260 (N.J. 2014)
(holding that the New Jersey state constitution guarantees the right for a member of a
condominium association to exercise freedom of speech in a privately owned building); Ralphs
Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 290 P.3d 1116, 1120 (2012)
(affirming the right to speak on privately owned shopping areas under the California
constitution); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 783– 
84 (N.J. 1994) (extending the right to speak to private property under New Jersey constitution);
Seth F. Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of Free Expression, 5 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 12, 45–46 (2002) (noting that Pennsylvania state constitutional cases appear to extend
expressive freedom to private action).
14. The propensity for state courts to more expansively affirm individual rights under state
constitutional provisions has been sometimes labeled as “New Judicial Federalism.” See Robert
F. Williams, Rights in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, VOL. 3: THE 
AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 7, 8 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, eds.,
2006); G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism, 24 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 63 (1994). 
15. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 13 (1998) (observing that
many state constitutional speech clauses do not specify guarantees only against governmental
incursions); see also John Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State
Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1986) (reviewing several different
state approaches to speech on private land).
 16. See Brady C. Williamson & James A. Friedman, State Constitutions: The Shopping Mall
Cases, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 883, 894 (1998). 
17. See Williams, supra note 14, at 15. 
18. See J. FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES, VOL. 1 § 5.02[2] (4th ed. 2006). 
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6 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
on state action as the Federal Constitution does, the provisions provide 
an individual entitlement.19 
Not all state constitutions follow this affirmative formula, and even 
among those that do, not all have been interpreted by their state courts 
as extending to private action.20 But state constitutional provisions that 
extend to private action typically share the affirmative wording. For 
example, California’s constitutional speech provision is typical of
affirmatively-worded state provisions, affirmatively guaranteeing
California citizens the right to freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, although also providing that legal penalties may be imposed 
for the abuse of that affirmative right.21 Because the California 
Constitution guarantees an affirmative entitlement to expressive
freedom, the provision has been interpreted as allowing for incursion
of speakers onto private property in some circumstances.22 
A minority of other states have interpreted their state constitutions 
similarly to provide affirmative expressive rights beyond those of the 
Federal Constitution.23 Among the states that have recognized a state 
constitutional right to expression on private property, there has been a
range of interpretations as to how often and how broadly the
constitutional right may be invoked.24 California, although a leader in
recognizing a broadened state expressive right, has been cautious about
allowing it to intrude on the right of private property owners. Oregon
has been somewhat more expansive, allowing trespass and other 
facially neutral regulations to be challenged on an as-applied basis if 
19. Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space and the Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 947, 951 
(1998). 
20. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 
18 HASTINGS  CONST. L.Q. 723, 736 (1991) (noting that a majority of states have declined to 
extend their free speech provisions to private action). 
21. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.”).
 22. See Joseph R. Grodin, Freedom of Expression under the California Constitution, 6 CAL.
L. HIST. 187 (2011). 
23. Williamson & Friedman, supra note 16, at 887.
 24. See id. at 887–93 (reviewing a variety of approaches by state courts finding a state
constitutional right to speak on private land); see also David Schuman, State Constitutionalism:
Using State Constitutions to Find and Enforce Civil Liberties, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 783, 788 
(2011) (discussing expanded speech protections under the Oregon Constitution); Seth F. Kreimer,
The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of Free Expression, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 12, 45–46
(2002) (noting that Pennsylvania state constitutional cases appear to extend expressive freedom
to private action); Jennifer Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s Treatments of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We Have the Freedom to
Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589 (2002) (reviewing New Jersey state constitutional expressive
freedom cases).












    
   
 
    
   
 
    
   
   
  
 
   
   
  
     
  
  
   
 
 
 72020] PATENTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH 
they impermissibly regulate speech.25 New Jersey is notable for its 
relatively broad recognition of state expressive rights. New Jersey has,
for example, extended its state constitutional rights of expression not 
only to speaking on shopping malls,26 but to private college campuses27 
and to pamphleteering in the mailboxes controlled by a private 
condominium owners’ association.28 
The division between the guarantees of federal and state 
constitutions is well illustrated by one of the earliest and most widely 
discussed cases, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,29 in which the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed a California Supreme Court 
decision holding that the state constitution guaranteed access for 
political speakers to a privately owned shopping mall.30 In reaching its 
conclusion, the California court balanced the state constitutional 
expressive rights of the speakers against the exclusive property rights 
of the shopping center owner, looking at four factors: the nature of the
speech at issue, the nature of the property at issue, the availability of
alternative fora, and the applicability of reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations.31 The court was persuaded that the state expressive
guarantees took preeminence for two reasons; first, because the 
shopping center was already open to the public, so the state 
constitutional requirement imposed a modest or negligible burden in
addition to activity the property owner had already invited.32 Second,
the state possessed plenary and police powers sufficient to regulate the 
25. See Schuman, supra note 24 at 795–96; see also Rex Anderson, Free Speech
Fundamentalism—Justice Linde’s Lasting Legacy, 70 OR. L. REV. 855 (1991) (describing the
Oregon jurisprudence on state constitutional expressive freedom as “absolutist.”). Oregon has
also extended state constitutional protection to categories of speech, such as obscenity, that are
unprotected by the federal First Amendment. See State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 17 (Or. 1987).
26. Green Party of N.J. v. Hartz Mtn. Indus., Inc., 752 A.2d 315, 325 (N.J. 2000); N.J. Coal. 
Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 783 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 812 (1995). 
27. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 632–33 (N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed sub nom., Princeton 
Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 101 (1982). Pennsylvania state constitutional cases similarly extend 
the right to expressive exercise to private college campuses. Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 
1382, 1390 (Pa. 1981). 
28. Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 103 A.3d 249, 260 (N.J. 2014). Dublirer
verified the right of pamphleteers not affiliated with the property to distribute their literature in
condominium mailboxes; other New Jersey cases affirm the right of tenants associated with the 
property to spread literature despite the landowner’s objections. See, e.g., Mazdabrook Commons 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 46 A.3d 507, 514 (N.J. 2012); Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v.
Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1073–74 (N.J. 2007).
29. 447 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1980). 
30. 592 P.2d 341, 345–48 (1979).
 31. Id. at 346–47. 
32. Id. at 347.
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disposition of private property in the public interest, making
constitutional impositions on the private owner similarly reasonable.33 
Reviewing the California decision, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed that even though the Federal Constitution does not 
guarantee the right to speak on private property, state constitutional 
provisions may do so.34 The Court held that such state provisions are
not preempted by the First Amendment, nor were the mall owners 
deprived of property without due process given that the California 
holding was not arbitrary or unreasonable in relation to California’s 
interest in promoting more expansive rights of expression.35 In
particular, the Court observed that mandating political expression for 
invitees to whom the property owner had already made access 
available was not a sufficient burden on the economic value of owners’
exclusive rights to constitute a constitutional taking.36 
If state constitutional speech guarantees can extend to the exercise
of private rights in real property, it seems useful to consider whether 
they can or should extend to exercise of private rights in intellectual 
property. Specifically, the broader expressive guarantees found in some
state constitutions raise the question as to whether such affirmative
rights might allow access to means of expression covered by intellectual 
property, particularly given that the state provisions may in some
instances allow rights to access real property even where access has not
been allowed under the federal First Amendment. 
II. SUPREMACY CLAUSE PREEMPTION
The reflexive argument against application of state expressive
guarantees to patents is that because patents are creatures of federal 
law, and because federal law preempts contrary state obligations,
patents cannot be subjected to such state constitutional restrictions.37 
But we should be suspicious of such arguments at the outset, as it is
clear that the disposition of patents and patented inventions is 
routinely subject to state law and state regulation.38 The Supreme Court 
has certainly held that some types of state law enactments are
33. Id. at 343.
 34. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 80–81. 
35. Id.
 36. Id. at 82–83. 
37. See TARR, supra note 15, at 43–44 (discussing how federal regulations, statutes, and 
constitutional provisions preempt conflicting state constitutional provisions).
 38. See Paul Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1582–83 (2015).




















   
  




      
   
   
         
     
 
    
 92020] PATENTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH 
preempted by the operation of federal patent law.39 But these
problematic state statutes have typically been state enactments that in 
some way compete with or attempt to displace federal patent law,
rather than state enactments that endorse or require a particular 
disposition of federal patents.
The question here would be whether state free speech provisions 
constitute impermissible interference with or permissible regulation of 
the disposition of federal patent rights. In order to separate permissible
from impermissible state provisions, we look to constitutional 
preemption doctrines. Federal enactments may displace state 
enactments due to the Supremacy Clause found in the Federal 
Constitution.40 Supremacy Clause preemption doctrine looks first to
examine any express statement from Congress regarding the
permissible interaction of state law with a given federal enactment.41 
However, this first step in preemption analysis is of little assistance for 
patents. Unlike copyright, where Congress has enacted an explicit 
statutory provision spelling out the parameters of permissible state 
operation,42 the patent statute contains no express preemption
language.43 
Thus, we have no explicit statement by Congress as to which, if any,
state provisions it might have intended to displace under the Patent 
Act. Where Congress has not expressly preempted state enactments,
the analysis then moves to consider implied preemption, gauging
whether Congress intended to preclude state activity without having
actually said so.44 Implied preemption comes in two flavors: field 
preemption and conflict preemption.45 Where Congress has “occupied
the field” in a given area of regulation, or where alternatively a state
law conflicts with Congressional purposes, the state law must give way.46 
39. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 231–32 (1964). 
40. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 
88, 108 (1992) (stating that the Supremacy Clause mandates preemption of state law that
interferes with federal law).
 41. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
42. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); see generally Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation,
and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 
509, 537–48 (1983) (tracing the history of the copyright preemption provision).
43. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
44. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). 
45. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
46. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
203–04 (1983). 
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10 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
The former type of implied preemption occurs where the regulatory 
structure in a given area indicates that Congress intended to exclude
state activity.47 Specifically, a reviewing court looks to see if federal 
regulation of the field is so pervasive or comprehensive that there is
simply no latitude left for states to act.48 The presence of pervasive
federal regulation in a variety of areas—such as aviation or nuclear 
safety regulation—creates the inference that Congress intended to fully 
“occupy the field” of activity in question, leaving no room for the states 
to regulate.49 This is more likely to occur in areas such as international 
relations or military operations, where federal rather than state 
interests are traditionally paramount. If the regulatory scheme appears 
to indicate such Congressional intent to preempt, courts infer that no
state activity is permissible.
It has been well established that Congress has not occupied the field 
or wholly excluded the states from legislating on matters of intellectual 
property generally, or issues touching patent law in particular.50 Federal
patent law can and does operate concurrently with a host of state 
provisions that either operate on the federal patent grant or function
in tandem with the federal patent grant. Sometimes state law provides 
alternative intellectual property options, as in the case of trade secrecy,
which the Supreme Court has held is a permissible state adjunct to 
patent law.51 Other times state law is allowed—and even relied upon— 
to govern the disposition of federally created intellectual property, as 
in the case of state employment52 or state contract laws.53 
If Congress has not explicitly spoken to preemption, nor has it 
occupied the field, states may be permitted to regulate in the area
assuming that they do not disrupt extant federal regulation.
Preemption analysis then asks whether a given state activity 
impermissibly interferes with the intent of a particular overlapping 
federal statute.54 Congress may have left room for state enactments, but 
a particular state enactment might still conflict with Congressional
47. Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO L.J. 2085, 2105 (2000). 
48. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
49. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
 50. See Dan L. Burk, Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal
Preemption, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 619–20 (1993). 
51. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491–93 (1974).
 52. See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 4–5 (1999) (discussing state law governing employee invention and assignment).
 53. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262–64 (1979) (holding that
state law licensing is not preempted by federal patent law).
54. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).


















    
    
     
   
   
   
      
  
 112020] PATENTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH
purposes, in which case the state statute must give way. Potential 
conflicts between federal and state laws in the same field could occur if 
the state somehow stands as an obstacle to the intended outcome of 
federal regulation,55 or if the state law upsets the balance that Congress 
has drawn in the field.56 In the patent field, conflicting state statutes 
have tended to either duplicate the protections offered by federal 
patents,57 or have attempted to withdraw from public use subject matter
left deliberately unprotected by the patent statute.58 
III. PERMISSIBLE STATE REGULATION
In general, although the patent statute has no express preemption
provision, there is ample evidence regarding Congress’s intent that the 
statute promote innovation via pecuniary reward.59 The Supremacy 
Clause question then becomes whether state constitutional provisions 
on expression conflict with or frustrate such Congressional purposes
enacted through the patent statutes. The answer to the question
depends in large measure on the particular action of the state 
provisions. Many avenues of state constitutional action could be
preempted: the patent statute sets forth substantive requirements for 
accomplishing the general congressional goal that would override any 
contrary or variant state requirements.
For example, it seems clear that state constitutional law could not 
dictate the requirements for issuance of patents; such state law would
be preempted by either express or implied Congressional intent as
manifest in the federal patent statute.60 Consequently, state
constitutional provisions could not prevent issuance of patents 
implicating speech, nor could they invalidate issued patents that did so.
Similarly, the Supremacy Clause would likely prevent states from 
meddling with patents implicating speech by attempting to dictate 
patentable subject matter, claim breadth, or other doctrinal 
characteristics intrinsic to the patent system. Federal preemption 
presumably cordons off not only doctrinal provisions found explicitly
in the patent statute, but also federal common law provisions, such as
55. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
56. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–39 (1973).
57. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
58. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164–65 (1989); Kellogg Co.
v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
59. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974). 
60. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (stating that a patent “shall” be issued if the applicant is
entitled under the law and pays the required fee).
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12 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
patent law’s Doctrine of Equivalents,61 or exhaustion, that constitute
judicial glosses derived implicitly or explicitly from the statute.62 
But this leaves open a wide range of state regulatory enactments 
that do not necessarily conflict with Congressional intent for patents, in 
particular, those dealing with the disposition of patents. As already 
mentioned, the federal patent statute explicitly imbues patents with the 
attributes of personal property,63 and personal property is 
unquestionably subject to state regulation. Patents are routinely 
bought, sold, licensed, and traded, all under the constraints of state 
contract law.64 They may be otherwise devised, inherited, or 
encumbered under relevant state law.65 Indeed, the application of such 
state law seems to have been anticipated and expected by Congress as 
an integral part of the patent system.66 
A. Traditional State Purview 
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence indicates that federal preemption
of state enactments is least likely in areas where states have a long
history of oversight and have traditionally had wide regulatory 
latitude.67 State “police powers” over health and safety regulation are
the most commonly cited subjects of state privilege.68 In the absence of 
any Congressional indication to the contrary, this would seem to apply 
to patents and patented inventions. States regularly restrict or ban the 
use or sale of patented devices that are dangerous, harmful, or even 
immoral.69 There is good reason to believe that the States would be well 
61. See Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer
and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2013 (2005) (describing the Doctrine of Equivalents). 
62. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Exhaustion and Federalism: A Historical Note, 102 VA.
L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2016) (arguing that federal judicial doctrine of exhaustion evolved so as to
protect state licensing from Supremacy Clause preemption).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012).
 64. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 
65. See Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating 
that patent ownership is a matter for state courts); Roach v. Crouch, 524 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa
1994) (holding that ownership of a patent is properly tried in state court).
 66. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”). 
67. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
68. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
69. See, e.g., Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885 (N.D. Tex. 1988)
(noting that use of patented radar detector would be illegal in some states, but not others); see
also Hunter Douglas Inc., v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding
that state tort claims are preempted by federal patent law only when, as applied, they address
conduct protected under the federal statute).








   









    
       
    
   
 
   




   
   
  
  
 132020] PATENTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH
within their powers to similarly ban the assertion of patents that are 
fraudulent, criminal, or anticompetitive.70 
An important consideration in this regard is that the patent owner’s 
federal rights are a collection of exclusive rights, that is, the right to
exclude others from engaging in the manufacture, use, sale, offer, and
importation of the invention set forth in the patent claims.71 The patent 
is not an affirmative right to practice the claimed invention. In 
particular, the patent owner obtains no right to practice the invention
contrary to the operation of regulation or legal oversight, whether 
instigated at the federal, local, or state level. For example, the patent 
confers no right to manufacture, sell, or import embodiments of the 
invention that are restricted as unhealthy, unsafe, or environmentally
destructive. Neither is the patented invention exempt from regulatory 
inspection, certification, taxation, seizure, or forfeiture. The mere
presence of a patent covering a particular invention in no way endorses 
deployment of that invention to further nuisance, defamation, or other
state-regulated damage or injury. 
The legitimacy of state regulation in fields where federal regulation 
is also operative is strongly bolstered if states are regulating in areas 
where they have traditionally been active or prominent. We have 
already noted that state law has been the primary means for disposition 
of patents, but more broadly it is clear that the states have an
established provenance, by legislation or otherwise, to regulate in
general the use and disposition of property.The express language of the
patent statute supports this conclusion; precisely because the federal 
statute specifies that patents are to have the character of personal
property, they may presumably be regulated by the state in the same
way that the state regulates such property.72 
70. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process Litigation, 13 SW.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 281, 307 (2007); see also Hunter Douglas, Inc., 153 F.3d at 1336 (holding that 
state tort actions may apply to bad faith assertion of patents).
 71. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
 72. But cf. Tun-Jen Chiang, Rehabilitating the Property Theory of Copyright’s First 
Amendment Exemption, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 521, 573 (2013) (asserting that “[t]o the extent 
that a state constitution attempted to create a right to infringe federal copyrights, it would be
trumped by the Supremacy Clause”). A full discussion of copyright preemption is well beyond
the brief of this article, so I will merely note that unlike the patent statute, the copyright statute
contains an express preemption provision that prevents the states from providing rights
equivalent to those of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018). Beyond that, it is clear that states can 
regulate the disposition of copyrights in a wide variety of circumstances as property, for example
by penalizing or prohibiting obscene copyrighted material, see Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema
Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that the 1909 copyright statute 
contained no explicit or implicit bar to the copyrighting of obscene works), or allocating 
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B. Regulating Federally Created Property 
Ownership in tangible property is typically an entitlement under 
state law, so that when states balance state constitutional rights against 
the exclusivity of real property owners, the states are to some extent 
simply modifying or characterizing their own legal enactments.
Similarly, to the extent that intellectual property, as a set of exclusive
rights, may resemble rights in tangible property, then along with that 
analogy comes the caveat that the rights entailed in real or chattel 
property are governmental creations and are subject to governmental 
regulation and restriction. In the case of patents, creation and 
regulation are effectuated under different regimes; unlike the
conventional rights in real property, patents are a grant of property
rights by the federal government. But we have already noted that such 
rights are transferred and effectuated according to state law. There is 
no reason to believe that federally granted rights necessarily are
immune to state regulation. 
To the contrary, state property regulation may include federally
created property. Certainly we can point to other examples of state 
regulation concerning federal endowments of exclusivity, including
those that implicate speech. In previous work I have argued that useful 
parallels regarding the interaction of federally granted exclusivity and
freedom of speech may be gleaned from the example of broadcast 
spectrum allocation.73 Spectrum broadcast shares with patentable 
inventions certain “public good” characteristics that require regulation 
in order to encourage investment and prevent conflicting usages;
spectrum allocations prevent signal congestion while encouraging 
productive use of a common resource. The allocation of broadcast 
frequencies is reserved to federal regulation. Federal spectrum
allocation grants recipients an exclusive right to a public resource,
allocated privately for the ultimate benefit of the public. 
As in the analysis of patents and the federal First Amendment,
federal spectrum governance may provide the best antecedent for 
copyrights as marital assets in community property, see Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 439
(5th Cir. 2000) (finding economic interest in federal copyright to be community property under
Louisiana law); In re Marriage of Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
federal copyright to constitute community property under California law). See also R. Anthony 
Reese, Be Careful Where You Live When You Die: Termination of Copyright Transfers and the
Road to Marriage Equality, UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2015-58,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2608130 (discussing the impact of state 
marriage law on copyright reversionary interests). 
73. See Burk, Patents and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 239–43. 





















    
    
 
     
 
    
 
 
     
 152020] PATENTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH
comparison when thinking about state constitutional rights. Federal law 
allocates exclusive use of a particular frequency of broadcast on the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Recipients of federal licenses have an 
effective property interest in their allocation; they can exclude others 
from broadcasting on the allocated frequency and can sell or sub-
license communicative activity on their frequency—for example in the
form of advertising. States are preempted from engaging in their own 
allocative preferences or procedures.74 
States cannot determine the allocation or re-allocation of spectrum 
exclusivity granted by federal authority. But states can surely punish 
use of federally allocated spectrum to engage in libel, fraud, or criminal 
activity.75 By the same token, although states cannot prevent issuance
of patents on inventions that could be used to damage the environment,
commit fraud, or physically injure a user, they can surely regulate or
even prohibit the deployment of such inventions, patented or not.76 
And if states can curtail or regulate the use of patents that facilitate 
bodily or reputational injury, they surely can, by the same logic, curtail 
or regulate the use of patents that facilitate or inflict constitutional
injury.77 
IV. PATENT EASEMENTS
Patent disposition, like that of other property, may therefore be said 
to fall within the historical regulatory purview of the states. As I have 
pointed out before, the favored comparison of intellectual property to 
real property—a dubious analogy at best78—carries with it the
implication that easements and other public regulation may apply to
intellectual property just as to real property.79 Whether imposed by 
federal or state regulatory requirements, exemptions to patent 
exclusivity parallel easements in real property. Understanding this 
parallel is useful in extrapolating from existing state constitutional 
speech cases. State constitutional decisions allowing the exercise of
expression on private property validate limitations on the property 
74. 45 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2012).
75. 45 U.S.C. § 253(b) (2012).
 76. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
 77. Cf. Friesen, supra note 10, at 130 (arguing that private deprivation of rights guaranteed
under the California state constitution would entail a constitutional tort).
 78. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031 (2005) (questioning the frequent but facile comparison between intellectual property and
real property).
 79. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 123–24 (1999). 
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16 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
owner’s right to exclude unwanted speakers or messages from the
property owner’s physical space. This might be thought of as a type of 
public easement for a limited purpose, intruding on the property 
owner’s normal exclusivity to effectuate a critical public interest– 
indeed, this is largely how the California Supreme Court in Pruneyard
justified the state constitutional expressive interest.80 
A. Compulsory Patent Licensing
Application of state constitutional guarantees to patent exclusivity
would likely entail a balancing against the patent owner’s right to 
exclude unwanted uses of the claimed invention, much like the four-
part inquiry found in the California Pruneyard analysis. This potential 
dispositional easement may be thought of in terms of compulsory
licensing of the affected patent.81 In intellectual property law, user
privileges and exemptions, like public easements, often resemble a 
compulsory license at a zero royalty—the public gains access to the
property, cannot be excluded, and in many cases may have no
obligation to pay for access.82 In other cases, compulsory licenses shift
the exclusive rights in property toward a liability regime, in which the
owner retains a right to be paid, but surrenders the right to exclude. 
Compulsory licensing, although fairly common in conjunction with
federal copyright, is something of a rarity in U.S. patent law. Patent law 
includes a very few explicit instances of compulsory patent licensing,
covering technologies considered essential to federal policies on
nuclear power generation and environmental protection.83 Courts have
also been known to impose what are effectively compulsory licenses in 
situations where public health or safety is deemed to require the
unauthorized use of patented technology. Thus, for example, in City of 
Milwaukee v.Activated Sludge, the Seventh Circuit denied a permanent 
injunction against the city’s infringing use of a patented sewage
treatment process, granting the patent owner only damages on grounds 
of the public interest.84 By denying the injunction, the court essentially 
created a compulsory license at a royalty set at the measure of proven 
damages.
80. 592 P.2d 341, 346 (1979).
 81. See Dan L. Burk, Punitive Patent Liability: A Comparative Examination, 37 REV. LITIG. 
327, 347–48 (2018).
 82. See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property in the Cathedral, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GEISTIGES
EIGENTUM/INT. PROP. J. 405, 408 (2012). 
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2183(e), 7608 (2012). 
84. 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934). 
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Until recently, such cases were a historical oddity due to the tight 
conceptual coupling between property and exclusivity. Property may 
entail multiple rights and privileges but is frequently characterized by
the right to exclude, which is typically exercised via judicial injunctions 
prohibiting some type of activity deemed to infringe on the property.85 
Thus, a permanent injunction against further infringing trespasses was 
long considered routine upon a finding of patent infringement.86 
But although patents are intended under their statute to be treated 
as personal property87 and the right to exclude is typically viewed as a 
key component of property entitlements, the Supreme Court has made
clear that patent owners are not always entitled to exercise their 
exclusive rights.88 Exclusive rights are typically exercised by means of 
judicial injunction, but the patent statute provides for such injunctions 
only after consideration of equitable principles.89 According to the 
Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange, the relevant equitable factors 
to be considered include the adequacy of a damages remedy, the
comparative balance of hardships between the parties when issuing or 
denying an injunction, and the public interest.90 Where these factors do 
not align in favor of an injunction, the patent owner is still entitled to
damages upon a finding of infringement, but may be denied exclusivity,
resulting in what is effectively a compulsory license at a royalty 
determined by the court.91 
The eBay injunctive calculus points toward potential free speech
“easements” in the patent property right. In considering whether to 
allow a patent owner to exclude expressive activity involving the 
patented invention, we can anticipate a federal court denying the
patent owner an injunction, based on the public interest prong of the 
eBay standard.Whereas in City of Milwaukee the injunction was denied 
due to the public interest in sanitation, in an expressive rights challenge
85. See Burk, supra note 79, at 134. But cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right
to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
593, 638–39 (2008) (noting that the modern equation of property with the right to an injunction
overlooks the equitable roots of injunctive relief).
 86. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
87. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
88. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006).
89. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
 90. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. A fourth factor listed by the Court is the likelihood of 
irreparable injury to the patent holder, but this seems coterminous with the adequacy of legal
remedies. See  THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 102, 102–03 (2013). 
91. Burk, supra note 82, at 410.
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18 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
an injunction might be denied due to the public interest in speech.
Presumably, there is nothing that would prevent a federal court from 
taking into account state articulations of public policy, and, to the 
extent they did not conflict with Congressional intent, relying upon
them as factors in determining the eBay public interest element. One 
might also formulate the interest in state constitutional expressive 
guarantees in terms of the other eBay factors; for example, in some
instances the denial of speech might be considered to impose too great 
a hardship on the infringing party, especially where a damages remedy
might offer adequate compensation for the patent holder.
B. Reverse eBay Analysis 
The implications of the Supreme Court’s eBay calculus might also
open the door to state court injunctions mandating speech-related 
disposition of a patent, or requiring a patent holder to permit 
expressive use of the patented invention. eBay tells us that the public 
interest—presumably including the public interest in state 
constitutional guarantees—is, by federal statute, a consideration 
affecting the exclusivity of patent rights. This suggests that it is
permissible for the states to consider this congressionally mandated
equitable element in a type of “reverse eBay” calculus—not with regard 
to whether infringement of a federally issued patent deserves equitable
relief, but with regard to whether a federally patented invention can 
permissibly be deployed to suppress state guarantees regarding speech.
A state court called upon to effectuate state constitutional speech 
guarantees in the face of patent exclusion might properly consider 
whether state constitutional rights would diminish or extinguish the
patent holder’s ability to obtain an injunctive remedy were the patent
before a federal court. 
Original jurisdiction for any claim arising under federal patent 
statutes must lie in federal district court,92 but a claim regarding state 
constitutional relief is not a claim arising under patent law and could
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). Assertion of a patent-based counterclaim, such as for
infringement damages, might be sufficient to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1454 (2012). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that federal statutory “arising under”
subject matter jurisdiction is only triggered when is sufficiently substantial to affect a case’s
outcome. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258–59 (2013) (holding that an issue of patent validity 
was not sufficiently substantial to remove a professional misconduct case from state to federal
court); see also Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635, 645 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (opining
in dicta that patent preemption claims should be considered “arising under” federal law). 




















     
  
    
  
  
    
   
 192020] PATENTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH
be decided in state court.93 As with the equitable calculus required
under eBay, the congressional policy in favor of patent exclusivity 
should weigh heavily in the consideration of a state court injunctive 
proceeding. And whereas under eBay the public policy favoring patent
incentives would weigh toward an injunction restraining an infringer,
in a “reverse eBay” proceeding it would weigh against the injunction 
restraining enforcement by the patent owner. But other interests such
as a state policy in favor of free expression might, in certain 
circumstances, tip the scales in favor of effectuating state constitutional 
guarantees.
The outcome of such considerations might be access to, or at least 
the right not to be excluded from, use of the patented expressive 
technology. But access might not necessarily be costless; damages or a
reasonable royalty might still accrue in the absence of injunctive 
exclusion.94 Such compulsory licensing would preserve the economic 
value of the patent, if not the full exclusive rights in the patent. Not 
coincidentally, such preservation of economic value was a key 
component in the Pruneyard analysis, leading the California Supreme
Court to conclude that the balance of interests between state
constitutional guarantees and private property rights tipped toward
public speech interests.95 Similarly, preservation of the property 
owner’s economic interests in Pruneyard led the United States
Supreme Court to approve the California Supreme Court’s analysis as 
not amounting to a taking of property.96 
Additionally, while the state constitutional requirement could not 
preclude federal statutory remedies, a state constitutional remedy 
could well be crafted in such a way as to either negate the benefit of 
the contemporaneous infringement remedy or to coerce the patent 
holder into surrendering the benefit of the federal remedy. For 
example, state courts can require the surrender or transfer of federally 
created intellectual property rights, just as they can require the 
surrender or transfer of any other personal property.97 There is no 
93. Cf. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258 (holding that a state law patent malpractice claim did not 
confer original jurisdiction as it did not arise under federal patent law); Thompson v. Microsoft 
Corp., 471 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that state law unjust enrichment claim was
not preempted by, and did not arise under federal patent law so as to confer original federal
jurisdiction). 
94. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
 95. See 592 P.2d 341, 343–46 (1979).
 96. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1980).
 97. See, e.g., Sheshtawny v. Sheshtawny, 150 S.W.3d 772, 774 (Tex. App. 2004) (dividing a
patent in a divorce); see also Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns., Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1343 (Fed. 
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20 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
reason to believe that a state court injunction requiring a patent holder 
to allow access to a patented technology, perhaps on pain of transfer of 
the patent, would run afoul of the Supremacy Clause, particularly if the 
patent holder is paid a reasonable royalty.98 
V. INVITING PUBLIC ACCESS
The analysis to this point suggests that the argument for state
constitutional guarantees would be strongest where a patent that 
impedes expression could be subject to an easement or compulsory
license for access. Additionally, the argument for the exercise of state 
constitutional expressive guarantees in the patent context would likely 
be strongest where the circumstantial balance of public and private
interests most closely parallels the circumstantial balance of interests 
arising in the cases validating expressive rights on private land.99 
Presumably, such circumstances would need to include some degree of
public use or accommodation parallel to the use of real property such
as a mall or similar publicly accessible space.100 Of course, the parallel 
cannot be exact, but certainly one might identify situations in which
either the patented technology is essential for communication to the 
public, or has been held out to the public for access and then withdrawn.
Optimally, both of these factors would be present in order to invoke
state constitutional guarantees.
One close possible parallel, in which a patent might be said to have 
been held out for public use or accommodation, might arise in the case 
of standard essential patents, or SEPs.101 Many situations exist in which
compliance with technical standards is required for a given device to
function in connection with other compatible devices, as for example 
in telecommunications.102 Without the common technical standard,
interaction between the devices is impossible. In some cases, the 
Cir. 2010) (holding that ownership of the patent in suit was determined by a California state 
divorce decree).
 98. See Burk, supra note 81, at 349–50 (discussing the development of judicially determined
“ongoing” patent royalties following eBay). 
99. Cf. Friesen, supra note 10, at 115 (arguing that state constitutional guarantees may be
properly limited by balancing against other private interests). 
100. Cf. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001) 
(holding that a type of expressive “state action” requirement is met under the California 
Constitution where private property has been held open and accessible to the public).
 101. Alison Jones, Standard Essential Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions, and the
Smartphone Wars, 10 EURO. COMP. J. 1 (2014).
 102. Id.; Joseph Scott Miller, Standard-Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing
and the Theory of the Firm, 40 INDIANA L. REV. 351, 351–53 (2007). 
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essential standard will be subject to a patent. In cases where the 
technical standard is covered by the SEP, the potential for legal 
exclusion from the standard becomes highly problematic: device
manufacturers who cannot incorporate the patented standard into their 
products are effectively shut out of the market.103 
Consequently, industry adoption of a patented standard will 
frequently occur only in conjunction with a public declaration by the 
patent holder that all users will be allowed to adopt the standard under 
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licenses.104 The
patent is, in other words, held out to all potential licensees who are
willing to pay a reasonable royalty. Disputes have arisen in which the 
patent holder, after making a public FRAND commitment, offers 
licenses that seem unfair or unreasonable.105 In other cases, patent 
owners have attempted to enjoin unauthorized uses of the standard,
despite having promised FRAND terms to all users—that is, the patent
holder seeks court-enforced exclusivity in circumstances where the
FRAND royalty would seem to be the proper measure of damages.106 
Significantly, FRAND disputes have been characteristic of 
telecommunications patents as a class of patents that will frequently 
implicate expressive interests and which may be essential for public 
communication. Disputes over such patents might be a fertile ground
for application of state constitutional speech guarantees, paralleling
past state constitutional cases, such as Pruneyard, that involve speech 
on real property. The FRAND commitment parallels the public 
invitation common to cases such as Pruneyard, in which public access 
to private property was held to include expressive activity. Such cases 
also often entail an element of expressive necessity, by which public 
communication would be curtailed or suppressed without access to the 
private property. In a similar vein, exclusion from a communication-
related SEP, much like exclusion from community venues such as
shopping centers, would be devastating to public communication. 
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the refusal of a 
previously publicly offered FRAND license should be analyzed as a
103. Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 43
(1989). 
104. Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and 
FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 311–13 (2014). 
105. Id.
 106. See Burk, supra note 81, at 355; see also William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking
the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 387–446 (2016). 
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22 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
species of fraud, or breach of contract, or promissory estoppel.107 
Notably, these are all state law doctrines that might be employed to
penalize a “bait and switch” maneuver by an SEP owner. The fact that
a patent was the subject of the fraudulent or estopped offer does not 
prevent state doctrines from penalizing the SEP owner. Similarly, a
state constitutional right of expression might also mandate that an SEP 
patent owner permit public access as promised, particularly if the 
economic value of the patent is preserved by payment of a reasonable 
royalty.
VI. PETITION CLAUSE PREEMPTION
An alternative set of constitutional preemption considerations 
could arise from a somewhat neglected provision of the First 
Amendment, the Petition Clause, which prohibits governmental 
interference with the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances.108 This portion of the First Amendment forms the basis for 
the Noerr-Pennington line of cases, which interprets the Petition Clause
as prohibiting an assertion of antitrust claims against defendants who 
have lobbied for legislation that could prove anticompetitive.109 That
rationale has been further extended by the Supreme Court to prohibit 
the use of court proceedings to assert antitrust claims against plaintiffs 
for asserting their own potentially anticompetitive claims in court.110 
107. See Robert P. Merges & Jeffery M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1914, 1935 (2002). 
108. U.S. CONST. amend. I. I note also in passing that there is a third potential source of 
constitutional preemption, which is the presence of the Patent Clause itself. As I have discussed
in previous work, one purpose for adding Article I, section eight, clause eight to the roster of
Congressional powers was to remove from the purview of the states conflicting assertions of
patents and copyrights, parallel with the purpose of the federal commerce power. See Burk, supra 
note 50, at 612–13. Jurisprudence on the operation of such a “dormant Patent Clause” has never
developed, although the famous commerce power decision in Gibbons v. Ogden was decided on
such grounds by the lower courts before the case reached the attention of Justice John Marshall.
See id. at 609–10. In any event, this type of preemption seems inapplicable to the current
discussion, as assertion of state constitutional clauses on expressive freedom does not attempt to
displace the federal patent power. Cf. Jeanne Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s
Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 265 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, ed., 2013) (arguing that the constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause has
independent preemptive force).
109. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137– 
38 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); see generally David
McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and
the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293 (1994) (explaining the Noerr-Pennington
petition cases).
 110. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972).
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The Court has held that such immunity against antitrust penalties does 
not extend to the assertion of “sham” or objectively baseless claims, but 
the threshold for triggering the sham litigation exception is quite
high.111 
Although the Supreme Court has never applied this doctrine
outside the antitrust context, some lower courts have extended the 
Supreme Court’s Noerr-Pennington rationale broadly in a variety of 
fields to bar assertion of state tort claims, such as misappropriation or 
abuse of process, that might be viewed as penalizing assertion of non-
frivolous court actions.112 In the patent context, the Federal Circuit has 
embraced this rationale to shield the actions of patent holders, either
in litigation or in preparation for litigation, against state penalties 
unless the enforcement action taken by the patent holder is objectively 
baseless.113 
As recent commentary has pointed out, the Federal Circuit’s 
extension of Noerr-Pennington considerations beyond the antitrust 
context is dubious, as the Supreme Court’s original analysis was as 
dependent on the character of the Sherman antitrust statute as it was 
on the constitutional Petition Clause.114 The Supreme Court has 
additionally made clear in other cases that, as a provision of the First 
Amendment, the Petition Clause does not confer protections to
petitioning speech that are more extensive than those conferred by
more familiar provisions of the First Amendment.115 This suggests that 
where the Petition Clause is implicated, its limitation on state 
regulation should track the outlines of First Amendment expressive 
guarantees that I have traced above, and state constitutional provisions 
that are more protective of speech than the Federal Constitution have 
never been perceived as interfering with federal guarantees.
It seems in any event unlikely that the Petition Clause is necessarily 
implicated in the assertion of state constitutional guarantees. So long 
as the requirement of the state constitutional provision is not framed
as a denial of or penalty against patent enforcement, there is no reason 
for the Petition Clause to apply. For example, the type of compulsory
licensing remedy I have suggested above does not bar patent holders 
111. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–62 (1993).
 112. See Gugliuzza, supra note 38, at 1645.
113. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
 114. Gugliuzza, supra note 38, at 1612–13. 
115. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
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from seeking redress in court, even if the outcome may not be the one 
preferred by a patent holder. Like other state law doctrines regarding 
the disposition of patents, state constitutional guarantees do not bar a 
patent owner from access to a tribunal, even if they may properly affect 
the outcome of adjudication. 
CONCLUSION
State constitutional speech provisions offer a narrow pathway
toward resolution of the tension between patents over expressive 
technologies and expressive freedom. As I have described here, only a 
minority of states has recognized broader protections for speech under 
their constitutions, and even among those states, courts have been 
cautious about imposing on the rights of property owners. Nonetheless,
in some circumstances, a state constitutional claim to expressive
freedom may be preferable to a federal constitutional claim. 
Thus, for example, in a recent article discussing the federal First 
Amendment implications of patents, Professor Chiang speculates 
about the potential use of patents on methods of communication to
restrict political speech.116 In a state such as Oregon or New Jersey,
assertion of state constitutional guarantees of expression might provide
relief from the exclusion of such communication that sidesteps the 
tricky question of First Amendment state action. Similarly, as I have 
outlined here, state constitutional expression might provide an
alternative to antitrust claims for SEP FRAND disputes. Relying on
state constitutional provisions may substitute the question of federal 
preemption for that of state action, but following the analysis I have
laid out here, this issue may be a preferable ground to litigate 
depending upon the plaintiff’s circumstances.
116. See Chiang, supra note 1, at 320–21, 323–24. Professor Chiang recommends that patent
misuse doctrine should be extended to deter such discriminatory enforcement of patents. See id. 
at 361–62. 
